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Abstract 
So far, research on the causes of over-indebtedness in Europe has predominantly focused on the 
characteristics of individuals or households. This article investigates to what extent country-level factors 
are associated with a European household’s risk of being over-indebted. We examine variables that 
reflect policies aimed at combating over-indebtedness (the average level of economic literacy prevalent 
within a country and its classification into a specific debt-discharge regime) and variables that reflect 
other welfare state policies (a country’s affiliation to a specific employment regime and a summary 
measure referring to the net replacement rate in the case of long-term unemployment). The results, 
which are based on multilevel logistic regression analyses of European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EUSILC) data for 27 European countries, suggest that all four country-level factors 
matter. This particularly applies to the variables reflecting other welfare-state policies, thus underlining 
the relevance of the design of social policy in fighting over-indebtedness.  
Keywords: over-indebtedness, country-level factors, cross-national research, multilevel analysis, EU-
SILC 
 
Introduction 
Under its initiative to fight poverty and social exclusion and against the background of the economic 
and financial crisis that hit Europe in 2008, the European Commission has defined tackling over-
indebtedness as a key challenge. In contrast to indebtedness, which is not necessarily problematic but 
simply a part of a household’s normal financial repertoire, over-indebtedness implies that households 
are no longer able to meet their financial obligations. A household’s illiquidity may then lead to poverty 
and social exclusion, aggravating these and related problems for society as a whole.  
The recent economic and financial crisis has increased the number of private households experiencing 
financial problems in Europe. In 2007, one year prior to the beginning of the crisis, 9 percent of all 
households in the EU-27 identified themselves as having great difficulties in making ends meet and 35 
percent as being unable to face unexpected expenses. By 2012, these figures had risen to 11 percent 
and 40 percent, respectively. Similarly, the proportion of households with payments in arrears rose 
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from 10 percent in 2007 to 11.4 percent in 2012.1 This latter indicator is often used in empirical 
research as a crude proxy for over-indebted households (Duygan-Bump and Grant, 2009; European 
Commission, 2008; Gumy, 2007).  
The data thus suggest an increase in the number of over-indebted households. Further evidence points 
at considerable variation between European countries, particularly since the crisis. In 2012, the 
proportion of households with arrears in payments ranged from 4 percent in Luxembourg to 39 
percent in Greece.2 But what accounts for these large differences between countries?  
To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the routes into and out of over-indebtedness. In 
this context, the literature usually differentiates between micro-level factors and macro-level factors 
(see, e.g., Dubois and Anderson, 2010; European Commission, 2008; Kilborn, 2009, 2011; Niemi- 
Kiesiläinen and Henrikson, 2005; Reifner et al., 2010). The former refer to individual or household 
characteristics (e.g. household size and composition) as well as the behaviour of individuals (e.g. their 
money management). Macro-level factors are relevant for the total population of a country and 
comprise, for instance, a country’s macroeconomic performance, its credit market characteristics or 
the policies it has implemented to combat over-indebtedness. In contrast to research conducted in the 
United States, European studies on over-indebtedness have predominantly examined the relevance of 
micro-level factors in explaining this phenomenon (with the exception of Duygan-Bump and Grant, 
2009).  
This article thus aims to examine the role of country- level factors in explaining the propensity to be 
over-indebted of European households. We are particularly interested in the relevance of both policies 
specifically designed to combat over-indebtedness and other welfare policies with different explicit 
aims. As proxies for outputs of the first type of policies, we chose the average level of economic literacy 
prevalent within a country and a country’s affiliation to a specific debt-discharge regime. For the latter 
type of policies, the net replacement rate concerning benefits paid by the welfare state to the long-
term unemployed and the classification of countries by employment regimes were selected as proxies. 
As will be shown, all of these country-level factors, particularly those referring to the wider social policy 
framework, help to explain differences in the rate of over-indebted households between countries.  
To achieve our research goal, we used information from the 2008 wave of the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset, which includes a special module on over-
indebtedness, as well as macro-level variables from various sources. With regard to methodology, we 
rely on multilevel logistic regressions, which make it possible to assess the relevance of both micro-
level and country-level variables in explaining over-indebtedness.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. We start by discussing relevant micro-level and 
macro-level factors that explain a household’s risk of being over-indebted. Next, we describe the 
variables included in the data analysis and the empirical approach adopted. Following this description, 
we present the results of the analyses and, in the final section, discuss these results.  
Factors accounting for the risk of over-indebtedness 
The routes into and out of over-indebtedness are multi-dimensional and complex. Previous research 
has shown that a household’s likelihood of facing periods of over-indebtedness is influenced by a 
variety of factors (for an overview, see Anderloni and Vandone, 2008). These can be located at either 
                                                          
1 All data are derived from the Eurostat database (9 December 2013). 
2 Data are derived from the Eurostat database (09 December 2013). 
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the individual or household level and/or be specific to the total population of a country. In this section, 
we discuss the theoretical arguments and present empirical evidence for the relevance of these factors 
in explaining over-indebtedness.  
 
Micro-level factors 
The over-indebtedness of households is usually the result of illiquidity, for which three causes have 
been identified in the literature. The first is the specific behaviour of an individual such as over-
spending as a result of poor money management (Anderloni and Vandone, 2010; Gathergood, 2012; 
Knobloch and Reifner, 2009; Livingstone and Lunt, 1992). The second is a persistently low household 
income which is ultimately exceeded by household expenditures (European Commission, 2008; 
Kempson, 2002; Knobloch and Reifner, 2009). The third refers to ‘critical’ life events (e.g. 
unemployment) that increase expenditures and/or decrease incomes, triggering an imbalance in a 
household’s budget (Reiter, 1991; Sullivan et al., 1989, 2006; Warren, 2004). With regard to the latter, 
empirical evidence has been collected which shows that a major decrease in household income leading 
to over-indebtedness can result from unemployment, separation or divorce, reduced employment 
income (e.g. because of a reduction of working overtime) and failed self-employment (Angele et al., 
2008; Goode, 2012; Himmelstein et al., 2005; Keese, 2009; Kim, 1996; Lyons and Fisher, 2006). In 
contrast, enhanced household expenditures include the establishment of one’s own household, the 
birth of a child or an unexpected rise in housing or other costs (e.g. health expenditures; Knobloch and 
Reifner, 2009).  
 
Country-level factors 
In addition to micro-level factors, also country-level factors affect a household’s probability of 
becoming over-indebted. This particularly applies to policies specifically designed to combat over-
indebtedness. In a 2008 report for the European Commission (2008), researchers identified six 
categories of preventive and alleviating measures that should be implemented in order to combat 
over-indebtedness effectively. Preventive measures include policies to help improve people’s financial 
competence (e.g. programmes to foster financial education), policies that protect consumers from 
irresponsible lending (e.g. the implementation of credit-scoring schemes, credit reports, usury laws) 
and policies that allow for responsible arrears management and debt recovery by lenders (e.g. 
instruments that help to avoid arrears, handle arrears and collect debts). Alleviating measures include 
the supply of debt advice services for consumers with financial difficulties, provisions to enable 
amicable arrangements outside the courts between creditors and debtors (e.g. formal procedures to 
set up payment plans) and provisions that allow for court arrangements (e.g. judicial debt settlement 
procedures, bankruptcy provisions).  
The empirical relevance of these policies has already been demonstrated. For example, programmes 
aimed at enhancing the economic literacy of individuals were shown to lead to an improvement in 
their abilities to manage their money. Individuals changed their spending behaviour, thereby reducing 
the probability that they would enter over-indebtedness (Dick and Jaroszek, 2013; Hilgert et al., 2003; 
Lusardi and Tufano, 2009; Schürz, 2006). Available data also suggest that credit reporting systems 
reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, resulting in two related effects. 
First, creditors deny credit to individuals with problematic credit histories, thus protecting the latter 
from irresponsible lending (Behr and Sonnekalb, 2012; Brown and Zehnder, 2007; Niemi-Kiesiläinen 
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and Henrikson, 2005). Second, it has been shown that borrowers have greater incentives to repay a 
debt, as they know that their documented credit record will influence their future access to credit 
(Padilla and Pagano, 2000; Turner et al., 2009). The latter is a good example of how policies create 
incentives which influence the behaviour of individuals.  
Such incentive effects have also been identified concerning bankruptcy regulations. For example, Fay 
et al. (2002) compare the costs of bankruptcy for a household in the United States with the benefits of 
debt relief. The authors show that households were more likely to file for bankruptcy if this increased 
their net financial benefit. There is also empirical evidence for Europe that indicates that the likelihood 
for default or late payment is higher in countries where it is more difficult for lenders to recover debt 
(Duygan-Bump and Grant, 2009). As these examples suggest, policies targeted at preventing or 
alleviating over-indebtedness reduce the probability that a household will experience over-
indebtedness. Thus, the country-specific mix of such policies should help to explain cross-country 
variations in the number of over-indebted households.  
In addition to policies that are specifically targeted to combat over-indebtedness, other policies may 
affect households with financial difficulties. This refers to welfare-state policies in particular. Indeed, 
the relevance of welfare benefits has already been demonstrated for the United States. Fisher (2005) 
found that, when controlling for different years and state-fixed effects as well as socio-demographic 
variables, a 10 percent increase in unemployment benefits led to a 2.2 percent decrease in the 
bankruptcy filing rate. Given that unemployment, underemployment or failed self-employment are 
also among the key causes leading to over-indebtedness in Europe (see above), it is likely that the 
welfare state’s contribution towards compensating lost (or low) employment income plays an 
important role in explaining differences in the risk of over-indebtedness among European households. 
The more ‘generous’ a welfare state is in this respect, that is, the more fully unemployment benefits 
substitute employment income, the less likely it is that households in this state will experience over-
indebtedness.  
It may seem obvious that the level of welfare benefits clearly influences the well-being of the 
recipients. In contrast, the well-being of the state’s population generally is affected more strongly by 
the institutional design of the welfare state in question (Esping-Andersen and Myles, 2009). This also 
applies to how individuals in a country are protected from misfortunes in the labour market. One 
approach to assessing ‘employment regimes’ is that of Gallie and Paugam (2000), who focus on the 
provision of unemployment benefits and the resulting dependency of an unemployed individual on his 
or her family. They found that Mediterranean countries form a distinct cluster characterized by low 
unemployment provision and a high degree of dependency on family support. At the other end of the 
spectrum, they identified a group of Scandinavian countries, which have generally adopted universal 
provision for the unemployed and, with their focus on redistribution through the welfare state, allow 
individuals a high degree of autonomy and independence from their families. Liberal and conservative 
welfare states were rather heterogeneous concerning these aspects, and harder to group.  
Another approach is that taken by Bukodi and Róbert (2007), who examined the strictness of 
employment protection legislation among different countries and the extent to which (active) labour 
market policies assist in sustaining employment. They suggest that the Scandinavian countries, which 
are characterized by both strong employment-sustaining policies and high flexibility on the labour 
market, form a distinct cluster. This also applies to conservative countries, which share the strong 
employment-sustaining policies with the Scandinavian cluster, but have very strict employment 
protection legislation and thus a less flexible labour market. The remaining welfare regimes are all 
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characterized by weak labour market policies. Those belonging to the liberal regime allow for highly 
flexible labour markets, whereas Mediterranean countries are characterized by very strict employment 
protection legislation. Post-socialist countries fall between the latter two regimes.  
Given that unemployment and a permanently low income are key explanatory causal factors of over-
indebtedness, we suspect that households in countries with strong employment-sustaining policies 
(i.e. particularly social-democratic and conservative welfare states) and a focus on redistribution (i.e. 
particularly social-democratic welfare states) should have a lower risk of being over-indebted 
compared to households in countries with weaker employment policies (liberal, Mediterranean and 
post-socialist regimes) and less focus on redistribution.  
 
 
Data, Variables and Methodology  
For our study, we used the EU-SILC User Database 2008. This includes a special survey module on debts 
and financial exclusion.3 The sample used for our analysis thus contains information on more than 
200,000 households from 27 European Union (EU) and European Free Trade Association countries. The 
macro-level variables relevant for our analysis were added to the dataset. The following section 
introduces the dependent and independent variables chosen for our assessment, including the data 
sources used for the macro-level variables.  
 
Dependent variables  
‘Material deprivation’ is one of the commonly agreed EU indicators of the social inclusion portfolio. 
This is determined by a household’s lack of three out of nine specified items, one of which refers to its 
financial inability to pay for rent, mortgage or utility bills. In the (few) cross-country comparisons on 
over-indebtedness published so far, this indicator has often been used as a dependent variable (e.g. 
Duygan- Bump and Grant, 2009; European Commission, 2008). Hence, we also operationalize over-
indebtedness as comprising all households that, during the last 12 months and/or at the time of the 
interview, were in arrears with payments for (a) mortgage or rent, (b) utility bills, (c) hire purchase 
instalments or other loan payments, or (d) other non-housing bills (the latter information is only 
available from the 2008 module of EU-SILC).4 These households are henceforth referred to as 
‘households in arrears’ (HIA).  
For their report, ‘Towards a common operational European definition on over-indebtedness’, a group 
of experts examined different definitions of over-indebtedness prevalent at both European and 
national levels (European Commission, 2008). It identified common core elements of the concepts and 
                                                          
3 See the European Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (n.d.) for a detailed description and codebooks 
for 2008. 
4 We use information from the European Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), User Database, 
variables hs010/hs011, hs020/hs021, hs030/hs031, mi060 referring to the ‘last 12 months’ and mi065, mi075, mi085 
referring to the ‘current situation’. The dataset also contains information on arrears with credit cards/store cards and on 
bank overdrafts. Preliminary analysis revealed that the majority of households do not hold credit cards (56%). Moreover, 
there is a significant difference in access to credit cards regarding income poverty and the educational level (of the head of 
the household). Thus, in constructing our dependent variable, we do not consider information on arrears with credit card 
payments or on bank overdrafts, which produced similar results.   
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proposed operationalizing a household as being over-indebted if it meets all of the following five 
criteria: (a) comparably high commitment payments push it below the poverty threshold, (b) it is in 
structural arrears with at least one financial commitment, (c) it considers the burden of monthly 
payment commitments at least ‘heavy’, (d) it considers its payment capacity at least ‘difficult’ and (e) 
it is unable to meet unexpected expenses (European Commission, 2008: 55).  
Based on this suggestion and the availability of information in the EU-SILC dataset, we constructed a 
second dependent variable which is a subgroup of the first. Starting with all ‘households in arrears’, 
we excluded those that expect their financial situation to improve within the next 12 months. This 
ensures that only households with structural, or enduring, financial problems, albeit subjectively 
defined,5 are maintained. Moreover, we excluded households that did not consider the financial 
burden of their total housing cost or of repaying debts from hire purchases or loans as ‘heavy’. We also 
excluded households that did not perceive it as ‘difficult’ or ‘very difficult’ to make ends meet. Finally, 
we excluded households that claimed to have the financial capacity to face unexpected financial 
expenses.6 The remaining group of households are henceforth referred to as ‘households at risk of 
over-indebtedness’ (HAROI).  
 
Independent variables 
The relevance of micro-level factors for a household’s probability of experiencing over-indebtedness 
is well documented. As discussed earlier, critical events that reduce income or enhance expenditures 
are identified as one group of factors causing illiquidity. EU-SILC contains a variable that asks whether 
a household has experienced a major income drop within the last 12 months, and which event caused 
this drop. Based on the empirical evidence, we hypothesize that households that have experienced 
such an income shock are more likely to be over-indebted than those that have not.  
In addition to ‘critical’ events, permanently low income has been identified as a key cause of illiquidity 
and of over-indebtedness in the long run. We include five variables reflecting relative income positions. 
The first is the equivalized personal income of individuals. Obviously, persons with low incomes (i.e. 
belonging to the first income decile) can be expected to have higher odds of being over-indebted 
compared to individuals belonging to the fifth and, particularly, the tenth income decile. Second, we 
include a dummy variable indicating whether a household has earnings from assets.7 We assume that 
households without such earnings will have higher odds of being over-indebted compared to the 
reference group. Third, empirical evidence suggests that both lone-parent households as well as two-
adult households with three or more children are more likely to be income-poor compared to other 
types of households (e.g. Chzhen and Bradshaw, 2012). Thus, these family forms are likely to have 
higher odds of being over-indebted than other family types. Fourth, we suspect, again following 
                                                          
5 Given that we utilize cross-sectional data, we cannot include longitudinal information on over-indebted households. 
Dynamic analyses of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and its predecessor, the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP), on households in arrears have been published, for example, for Austria 
(Angel and Heitzmann, 2013).  
6 The European Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) does not contain full information on the 
level of commitment payments. Thus, we are not able to meet the first criteria of the experts’ proposed definition.  
7 Interest, dividends, profits from capital investment, income from rental of property or land. 
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empirical evidence,8 that households with a male top-earner9 will have lower odds of being over-
indebted than households with a female top-earner. Fifth, we assume that the older the top-earner in 
the household, the lower the odds that this household will be over-indebted. The rationale for this 
assumption is that employment income usually rises with work experience and thus with age. The final 
variable included in the micro-level analysis (highest educational level achieved by the top-earner) 
mirrors the likely income position of the household in question, but may also be interpreted as a proxy 
for specific behaviour. We assume, again supported by a broad body of empirical evidence (e.g. Becker, 
1993; Heckman, 2008), that the higher the educational level of the top-earner, the higher the 
household income will be and the lower the propensity to become over-indebted. Moreover, we argue 
that the level of financial literacy is linked to the educational level of the top-earner. We suspect that 
the higher the achieved educational level of the top-earner, the higher the level of financial literacy 
within the household and, consequently, the lower its probability of being over-indebted.  
To examine the relevance of macro-level factors in explaining the probability that a household will 
experience over-indebtedness, we have chosen four variables that reflect country characteristics. The 
first two variables refer to specific policies implemented to combat over-indebtedness. The remaining 
two refer to other welfare-state policies.  
We have screened a multitude of secondary data sources containing information on policies that 
attempt to combat over-indebtedness (Dubois, 2012; European Commission, 2008; Habschick et al., 
2007; IFF and ZEW, 2010; Kilborn, 2011; Micklitz, 2012; Niemi, 2012; Niemi et al., 2009; Niemi-
Kiesiläinen and Henrikson, 2005; Reifner et al., 2003; World Bank, 2013). However, the information 
available is either too limited to allow for a sensitive analysis,10 not comparable due to differences in 
collecting the data,11 and/or only available for a small number of countries. Based on these 
shortcomings, we decided to include two indicators approximating the specific outputs of over-
indebtedness policies.  
The first variable refers to an important policy aiming to prevent over-indebtedness, that is, 
programmes that increase the financial literacy of citizens within a country. Some comparative 
information is available on the number of programmes implemented to increase financial literacy in 
selected countries (Habschick et al., 2007). However, these data do not allow any inferences to be 
made concerning the scope, quality or coverage rate of these programmes. Thus, we follow an 
approach adopted by Jappelli (2010) and Lo Prete (2013) and rely on information on the average level 
of economic literacy prevalent within countries. This indicator reflects the results of all (public and 
private) initiatives or programmes (including, e.g., regular courses at school) that should help improve 
the economic literacy of the population. Information on this indicator is collected annually and 
published in the World Competitiveness Yearbook of the International Institute for Management 
Development (IMD, 2013). To calculate the level of economic literacy within a country, interviews with 
                                                          
8 In the EU-27, women’s gross hourly earnings were on average 16 percent below those of men in 2011 (data from the 
Eurostat database). 
9 Defined as the household member with the highest personal income (sum of employee cash or near cash income, cash 
benefits or losses from self-employment, imputed money value for company car, unemployment and old-age benefits, all 
other social monetary benefits). 
10 For example, the available data only make it possible to identify whether or not countries have implemented specific 
programmes without providing further information on their content, quality, scope or coverage rates (e.g. European 
Commission, 2008). 
11 For example, information on the proportion of people registered within a credit registry is available for a broad variety of 
countries (www.doingbusiness.org/data). Further assessment of these data shows that they differ concerning the 
population considered. Some countries include the total population within such registries, while others only include 
households/individuals with a credit history. 
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4000 senior business leaders from 55 countries are conducted annually. As members of the top and 
middle management of local or foreign enterprises, they are asked to evaluate the country in which 
they have lived and worked for the past year on a 0–10 scale with regard to the statement: ‘Economic 
literacy among the population is generally high’. As argued by Jappelli (2010), there are two advantages 
to using these data. First, they allow for a consistent comparison of economic literacy across many 
European countries. Second, the business leaders interviewed usually work in enterprises with an 
international dimension and should therefore be less inclined to use country-specific response scales.  
To compensate for annual variations concerning this indicator, we calculated an average value of this 
index based on the years 2005 to 2008. Data on ‘economic literacy’ is available for 25 of our study 
countries, and vary from a low of 3.03 points in Romania to a high of 7.69 points in Iceland (see Table 1). 
Supported by existing evidence (Dick and Jaroszek, 2013; Hilgert et al., 2003; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009; 
Schürz, 2006), we expect that the higher the average level of economic literacy within a country, the 
lower the propensity of its households to be over-indebted.  
The second macro-level variable refers to an alleviative measure to successfully combat over-
indebtedness, namely the extent and quality of provisions that allow for court arrangements between 
creditors and debtors (European Commission, 2008).To enable a sensible comparison of the different 
schemes available within European states (for an overview of the specific policies, see, e.g., Schönen, 
2009, 2010), we rely on a clustering provided by Hoffmann (2012). Based on the information on 
discharge conditions in a variety of European countries which is available for 20 of the countries in our 
study, the first regime covers countries in which there were either no or only very strict12 consumer 
debt-discharge mechanisms in place in 2008 (see also Table 1). This group mainly includes countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, but also Greece, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg. The second regime type 
refers to countries which allow for a partial discharge of debts. Examples include Latvia and the Czech 
Republic, but also Austria and Portugal. The remaining discharge regimes all allow a complete 
discharge of debts, although they vary in their approaches. We cluster the Nordic countries as well as 
Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium into one group. Finally, the policies prevalent in the United 
Kingdom (and France) are identified as ‘most debtor-friendly’ due to their low admission thresholds 
and short procedures leading to immediate discharge, and thus form a distinct regime. These countries 
are the most attractive destinations for relief-seeking debtors from all over Europe, as the European 
Insolvency Regulation (EIR, 1346/2000/EC) means a discharge granted successfully in one member 
state is generally recognized in the home country as well (Hoffmann, 2012: 462).  
As a result, two contradicting hypotheses may be formulated regarding the likely effects of belonging 
to different discharge regimes, provided over-indebted households do not move to other countries for 
a debt discharge. First, households located in countries with no or only weak discharge mechanisms 
are less likely to be over-indebted if the incentive hypothesis is valid and households are unwilling to 
face the higher costs/difficulty of being discharged from their debts. An alternative hypothesis suggests 
that countries with no or only very weak discharge regimes are likely to have more over-indebted 
households, as their chances of escaping their debts are lowest. In other words, over time, more and 
more households are added to the disadvantaged group while only few households can escape (given 
that court arrangements to discharge of their debts are not available). As we rely on cross-sectional 
data in our empirical analysis, we cannot disentangle these two possible mechanisms but should be 
able to observe a net effect.  
                                                          
12 For example, the conditions in Ireland were so strict that in 2008 only eight people went bankrupt. 
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The remaining two variables refer to the other welfare-state policies that are relevant for explaining 
differences in the propensity of households to be over-indebted. One of these reflects the ‘generosity’ 
of welfare states with regard to individuals receiving income security outside the labour market. The 
underlying concept of de-commodification has been introduced by Esping-Andersen (1990) into the 
welfare- state literature. Unfortunately, available data on the de-commodification index proposed by 
Esping- Andersen are either outdated (Scruggs, 2004) or do not include the appropriate type of 
information for our research interest (Scruggs et al., 2013.). Given that unemployment is a key cause 
of over-indebtedness, we thus rely on a summary measure representing the net replacement rate 
(NRR) in the case of long-term unemployment. This rate is calculated by comparing the aggregate level 
of welfare-state benefits paid with the level of the previous employment income. The NRR can achieve 
a level between 0 percent (no benefits are paid) and 100 percent (employment income is fully 
substituted by welfare benefits). Benefits considered in calculating this replacement rate include 
unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, social assistance and housing benefit. The 
summary measure is calculated by considering two different levels of earnings, three family situations 
and 60 months of unemployment. Comparable data on this summary measure are available from the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database for a broad variety of 
countries.13 For our analysis, we chose data for 2007, since most income data included in the EU-SILC 
module of 2008 refer to this income year. The net replacement rates for the countries in our study 
range from a low of 23 percent in Italy to a high of 74 percent in Norway and Denmark (see Table 1). 
We hypothesize that the higher the rate within a country, the less likely it is that its households will be 
over-indebted.  
Given the relevance of employment-related explanations for over-indebtedness, the final variable 
reflects different employment regimes. We use the typology introduced by Gallie and Paugam (2000), 
extended by Bukodi and Róbert (2007), and applied by Whelan and Maître (2010), among others. We 
cluster our countries into five regime types (see Table 1). We differentiate between a liberal regime 
(Ireland, UK), a corporatist regime (Austria, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg), a social-democratic 
regime (all Scandinavian countries, Iceland and the Netherlands14), a Mediterranean regime (Cyprus, 
Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal) and a post-socialist regime (covering 10 countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe). We expect that households which form part of the social-democratic regime, with its 
emphasis on universalism, its high level of security regarding both labour market policies and 
unemployment benefits, and the high extent of labour market flexibility will have the lowest risks of 
being over-indebted in Europe.  
 
--- Table 1 --- 
 
Estimation Methods 
As already discussed, we hypothesize that differences in the likelihood of over-indebtedness between 
countries are not only explained by micro-level factors but also by country-level factors. To account 
for differences between countries, we use two alternative estimation strategies.  
                                                          
13 Data retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/GRR_EN.xlsx, 14.10.2013. 
14 We follow Whelan and Maître (2010) in grouping the Netherlands to the social-democratic cluster. 
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First, we employ several one-step multilevel logistic regressions. For Model 1, the country-level is 
included by random intercepts15 (Cheslock and Rios-Aguilar, 2011; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012), 
whereas for Model 2, by country dummies. These types of regression analyses make it possible both 
(a) to account for similarities in observations relating to the same country and, more importantly (b) 
to examine to what extent the regression constants vary across countries. Models 3–6 again include 
countries as random intercepts. In each of these models, we include one of our four independent 
macro-level variables.  
As a second research strategy, two-step multilevel logistic regressions are applied (Raudenbush and 
Bryk, 2006). This type of analysis is recommended for multilevel models in which the number of 
second-level groups (i.e. the number of countries analyzed) is relatively small (Bryan and Jenkins, 2013; 
Huber et al., 2005; Maas and Hox, 2005; Moineddin et al., 2007; Paccagnella, 2011). In a first step, the 
dependent variables are regressed on the micro-level variables for each country, thereby calculating 
intercepts. In a second step, the intercepts are then used as dependent variables and regressed on the 
macro-level variables.16  
 
 
Results 
As can be seen in the last two columns of Table 1, 11.5 percent of all households in the 27 European 
countries analyzed were in arrears (HIA) in 2008, and 3.5 percent were at risk of over-indebtedness 
(HAROI). As already indicated in the introduction, there are considerable differences between nation 
states. In the same year, only 3.1 percent of all households in Luxembourg were in arrears, while this 
applied to 34.9 percent of Bulgarian households. Denmark had the lowest proportion of HAROI with 
0.7 percent, while Bulgaria remained the outlier with a rate of 14.3 percent. As discussed earlier, HAROI 
are a subgroup of HIA. It is interesting to note that the size of the former group as a proportion of the 
latter also varies between countries. In some countries, about half of all households which are in 
arrears with their payments are also at risk of over-indebtedness. In other countries, however, this 
only amounts to an eighth, while the EU-27 average is 30 percent. Obviously, in some countries, most 
notably in Cyprus, the Czech Republic, but also Ireland, Hungary, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria 
and Poland, being in arrears appears to be a more enduring problem than in other countries in the 
study. Interestingly, all countries belonging to the social-democratic employment regime group have 
(far) below-average levels of HAROI as a proportion of HIA.  
The results of the multilevel estimations are summarized below. Table 2 contains the results of the 
first two multilevel logistic regressions, which include both micro-level and country-level information. 
For Model 1, country differences are included on the basis of random intercepts, which make it 
possible to determine whether country-level differences exist (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012: 532). 
The results of this, measured by the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), suggest that about 12 
percent of the variation in both dependent variables is explained by country-level differences.  
                                                          
15 We use the xtlogit command in STATA with the default of 12 quadrature points for the log likelihood approximation. A 
check for 8 and 16 quadrature points was conducted via the quadcheck command. Test statistics did not suggest a change 
of the number of quadrature points (no changes of the point estimates before the fifth decimal digit). 
16 For this analysis, we utilized the edvreg procedure in STATA (Huber et al., 2005; Lewis and Linzer, 2005), which applies a 
weighted least-squares estimation with robust S.E. to the data. 
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Regarding micro-level variables, Table 2 also reveals that almost all critical events leading to a major 
drop in income are associated with statistically significant higher odds of being over-indebted 
compared to households that have not experienced such an income decline. Factors affecting the 
employment or employability status of the household appear to be of the greatest importance. 
Furthermore, most of the coefficients for the remaining micro-level variables show the expected 
results. The higher the equalized income, the older the household’s top-earner and the higher his/her 
educational level, the lower the propensity of the household to be in arrears or at risk of over-
indebtedness. Moreover, a household with income from assets has a negative correlation with over-
indebtedness. The data also confirm that households with a female top-earner have higher odds of 
being over-indebted compared to households with a male top-earner. Concerning household 
composition, the results suggest that those with dependent children, most notably single-parent 
households and households with three or more children, bear a higher risk of being over-indebted 
compared to the reference group, that is, one-person households. All of these results support earlier 
studies on over-indebtedness and appear to be robust, given that they have been confirmed for both 
definitions of over-indebtedness applied in our study.  
For the estimation of Model 2, we included countries as dummy variables. This makes it possible to 
examine whether the effects of the micro-level variables on over-indebtedness change when 
controlled for unobservable country characteristics. The results suggest that there are some changes 
concerning the effects of the household-level factors. However, these changes are not substantial and 
even disappear when using less complex estimation procedures.17 Furthermore, and as one would 
expect, countries with the highest proportions of HIA and of HAROI (see Table 1) are also those with 
the highest odds ratios displayed in Model 2.  
 
--- Table 2 --- 
 
The results presented so far suggest that variations among over-indebted households across countries 
are indeed influenced by country-level differences. In the following, we summarize the results that 
explain the contribution of the four macro-level variables we have selected in explaining these 
differences. Methodologically, and as mentioned above, we rely on both one-step and two-step 
multilevel logistic regressions.  Table 3 contains the results of the one-step multilevel regression 
models, in which the country-level variables and all of the household-level variables have been 
included.18 The resulting parameters show which factor changes the odds of being over-indebted if a 
household in a country with a certain macro setting is compared to a household in a different setting. 
Due to limitations of space, we only display the estimated results of the country-level parameters,19 
since the parameters for the household-level variables did not change substantially between the 
different models and compared to the results presented in Table 2.  
                                                          
17 Observed differences are mainly due to the fact that in the country-dummy models it is possible to account for complex 
sampling by using special weights. Estimating these models without complex sampling weights results in almost identical 
parameters as in the random effects models. 
18 Additional analyses suggested that the inclusion of control variables (we introduced the gross domestic product (GDP), 
the GINI index and social protection expenditures as a proportion of GDP) led to an over-specification of our models. Some 
of the macro-level variables chosen lost their statistical significance. Obviously, the number of 20 to 27 countries, included 
in our multilevel regression analyses, is too small to allow for a joint assessment of more than one macro-level indicator at 
the same time.  
19 Complete estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Concerning HIA, only the net replacement rate and countries belonging to the partial debt-discharge 
regime (compared to countries with no or very weak discharge possibilities20) appear to have a 
significant influence on the probability of a household being in arrears. The effects of these variables 
are as expected: the higher the net replacement rate, the lower the odds that households in these 
countries will be in arrears. Similarly, households in countries with partial debt-discharge possibilities 
are less likely to be over-indebted (with an odds-ratio amounting to 0.431) than households with no 
debt-discharge possibilities. Interestingly, households in countries with full discharge possibilities have 
higher odds compared to countries with partial debt possibilities (0.698). Concerning debt-discharge 
regimes, the odds of being in arrears are indeed as high in the most debtor-friendly countries as in 
nations with no or only very weak discharge regimes. Even though the latter two results are not 
statistically significant, it appears that both hypotheses proposed above may be possible explanations 
for these results.  
In contrast to HIA, all four macro-level indicators have a significant effect on the propensity of 
households to be at risk of over-indebtedness. The results suggest that an improvement of one point 
on the economic literacy index reduces the odds of households being at risk of over-indebtedness by 
approximately 18 percent. Moreover, and compared to households living in a country with no or very 
weak discharge mechanisms, it is particularly regimes with a partial and, even more so, a full discharge 
regime in which the likelihood that their households will be over-indebted is considerably lower (by 
approximately 50%). This result suggests that the alternative hypothesis about debt-discharge regimes 
given above (i.e. that households in countries with no or only weak discharge possibilities are more 
likely to be over-indebted as their chances of exiting over-indebtedness are smaller) appears to be 
more relevant than the first hypothesis. The results also confirm a significant effect of the net 
replacement rate. If this rate is enhanced by one percentage point, the odds of households being at 
risk of over-indebtedness decreases by 2.4 percent. Concerning employment regimes, LR statistics 
suggest that this variable does not have a significant influence on the likelihood of HAROI. However, 
the odds are approximately 50 percent lower for households located in countries belonging to the 
social-democratic group than for households in the post-socialist regime. This supports the plausibility 
of the hypothesis forwarded above. With the exception of the Mediterranean countries, the other 
regimes also display lower odds than the reference group. However, these results are not statistically 
significant.  
--- Table 3 --- 
 
The first step in conducting two-step multilevel logistic regressions requires estimating separate 
models for each of the countries in the sample. To achieve the relevant results, we include all micro-
level variables into these analyses and calculate an intercept for each of the 27 countries being studied. 
These intercepts represent the country-specific baseline odds of being over-indebted. The second step 
of two-step multilevel logistic regressions requires entering the intercepts as dependent variable and 
the country-level variables as independent variables into a model. Following the suggestion of Bowers 
and Drake (2005), we illustrate the results of these estimates for each of the countries and regimes 
studied using graphs in Figure 1. The figure displays the associations between the estimated intercepts 
and the four country-level variables. Concerning HIA, there appears to be no relationship with any of 
the four variables analyzed. With regard to HAROI, however, it is possible to see a modest negative 
                                                          
20 However, LR tests suggest that debt-discharge regimes as such do not have a significant influence. 
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relationship concerning the level of economic literacy prevalent within a country and the average level 
of its net replacement rate in the case of unemployment. Furthermore, households belonging to social-
democratic welfare regimes and belonging to full discharge debt regimes are correlated with a lower 
probability of being at risk of over-indebtedness.  
 
--- Figure 1 --- 
 
Table 4 contains the results of the second step of the two-step logistic regression models (Models 7–
10). In contrast to the one-step analysis, the parameters are in a different metric; they represent the 
change of the country-specific intercepts (expressed in log odds) due to a change in the macro-level 
variables.  
Unsurprisingly, and confirming the results displayed in Figure 1, none of the four country-level 
variables is statistically significant concerning the group of HIA. Concerning HAROI, results suggest that 
the two variables which represent outcomes of policies implemented to combat over-indebtedness do 
not have a significant effect on the propensity of households to be over-indebted. However, the 
variables indicating other welfare-state policies show a significant effect. The estimated effects once 
more support our hypotheses: the higher the net replacement rates for the long-term unemployed, 
the lower the propensity of households in these countries to be at risk of over-indebtedness. 
Moreover, households in countries belonging to a social-democratic regime have a considerably lower 
propensity of being at risk of over-indebtedness compared to households in post-socialist countries. 
In contrast, households located in liberal, corporatist or Mediterranean welfare states do not appear 
to be significantly different from the reference group concerning their propensity to be over-indebted.  
 
--- Table 4 --- 
 
Discussion 
This article aimed to examine the relevance of four country-level factors (the average level of economic 
literacy prevalent within a country; its classification into a specific debt-discharge regime; its affiliation 
to a specific employment regime; a summary measure referring to the net replacement rate in case of 
long-term unemployment) for explaining the large differences in the rates of over-indebted 
households among 27 European states. Depending on the methods chosen for our analysis and the 
operationalization of ‘over-indebtedness’, it has been possible to see that all four country-level 
variables are statistically significant in explaining the propensity of households to be at risk of over-
indebtedness. When using a conservative estimation method, the two variables related to general 
welfare-state policies (the net replacement rate and employment regimes) appear to be more relevant 
predictors of cross-country variations than the two variables that reflect policies that are specifically 
designed to combat over-indebtedness (economic literacy and debt-discharge regime). This underlines 
the relevance of the wider social policy framework in addressing over-indebtedness.  
The results of our research emphasize the importance of applying a multilevel perspective and 
methodology to study the phenomenon of the over-indebtedness of private households. Some 
findings stand out. For example, almost all of our micro-level factors (e.g. household type, educational 
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level of the top-earner, gender of the top-earner, households that have experienced a major income 
drop) are relevant predictors for the probability that a household will experience over-indebtedness. 
In contrast to country-level factors, moreover, these micro-level variables are relevant predictors for 
both HIA and HAROI. Country-level factors appear to be more relevant predictors for the smaller group 
of HAROI. This suggests that country variations make a difference if households face enduring financial 
problems. However, as the definition of HAROI includes information based on the self-evaluation of 
the respondents, cross-country variations may be influenced by cultural factors.   
Our results also suggest that further research is needed to better understand which (micro-level and) 
macro-level variables explain cross-country differences in the number of over-indebted households 
across Europe. We have drawn on a vast variety of publications as well as secondary and primary data 
sources to detect information that would reflect inputs or outputs of policies targeted to combat over-
indebtedness. However, we have been confronted with a lack of data for a multitude of countries, the 
low quality of the available data which proved inapt for our purposes or data that are not comparable 
across countries as that have not been collected according to the same standards. For some policies 
combating over-indebtedness, for example, measures concerning irresponsible lending, information 
does not exist at all. Unfortunately, even the data we have used are in part not of the best quality. For 
example, the average level of educational literacy is only calculated on the basis of interviews with 
business leaders within the respective countries. Consequently, due to the limitations concerning the 
availability of macro-level data our analysis should not be interpreted as a direct evaluation of the 
causal impact of certain policies. Thus, an important future research endeavour would be to identify 
and collect relevant macro-level data of good quality which would then be comparable across 
countries.  
Research evidence suggests that a meso-level approach might also be relevant for explaining 
differences in the rate of over-indebted households across countries. For example, Barron et al.’s 
(2002) estimations for US counties covering the period 1993–1999 show significant (but small) 
increases in the number of personal bankruptcy filings after the introduction of casino gambling at the 
county level. This example also suggests that it would be necessary to conduct dynamic panel analyses 
to further examine the propensity of households to be over-indebted. This would help to rule out 
endogeneity problems and to better understand the ways into and out of over-indebtedness which 
might explain differences in the rates of over-indebted households between countries. Finally, it would 
be a worthwhile future research endeavour to examine and select further possible definitions and 
indicators to better operationalize over-indebtedness. It can thus be concluded that over-
indebtedness is a social risk that is still in its infancy with regard to research, despite its prominent role 
in the European Commission’s effort to fight poverty and social exclusion.  
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Table 1: Independent country-level variables and dependent variables: descriptive sample statistics  
 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
 
Economic 
literacy 
(2005-2008) 
Debt-
discharge 
regimes* 
Net 
replacement 
rate (2007) 
Employment 
regimes** 
HIA 
% of total 
(2008)*** 
HAROI  
% of total 
(2008)*** 
Austria 6.04 2 55 2 8.1 2.2 
Belgium 5.52 3 62 2 8.5 3.0 
Bulgaria 3.98 1 37 5 34.9 14.3 
Cyprus n.a. n.a. 54 4 13.2 6.9 
Czech Republic 5.15 2 50 5 4.4 2.3 
Germany 5.17 3 56 2 9.0 1.5 
Denmark 7.06 3 74 3 5.3 0.7 
Estonia 5.85 n.a. 38 5 7.7 1.0 
Spain 3.33 n.a. 51 4 6.9 2.2 
Finland 6.83 3 63 3 15.7 2.6 
Greece 4.59 1 28 4 24.9 7.8 
Hungary 4.53 1 46 5 13.9 6.1 
Ireland 6.92 1 70 1 10.4 5.0 
Iceland 7.69 n.a. 56 3 14.8 2.2 
Italy 3.63 1 23 4 15.1 5.8 
Lithuania 3.83 1 35 5 7.7 2.0 
Luxembourg 5.39 1 63 2 3.1 0.8 
Latvia  n.a. 2 43 5 14.1 4.9 
Netherlands 6.45 3 68 3 5.9 1.3 
Norway 6.22 n.a. 74 3 9.4 1.4 
Poland 3.33 1 45 5 11.8 4.7 
Portugal 3.33 2 60 4 6.0 2.5 
Romania 3.03 1 31 5 24.7 6.7 
Sweden 6.41 3 62 3 6.2 0.9 
Slovenia  3.83 n.a. 54 5 16.7 5.2 
Slovak Republic 3.97 n.a. 40 5 5.1 2.1 
United Kingdom 4.63 4 51 1 13.2 2.3 
Average of  
27 countries 
 
 
   
11.5 
 
3.5 
N 25 20 27 27 27 27 
Notes: HIA: households in arrears; HAROI: households at risk of over-indebtedness; n.a.: no data 
available; * 1 = no or very weak discharge mechanisms, 2 = partial discharge, 3 = full discharge: 
Scandinavian approach or German law approach, 4 = full discharge: most debtor-friendly regime; ** 1 
= Liberal, 2 = Corporatist, 3 = Social Democratic, 4 = Mediterranean, 5 = Post-socialist; *** weighted 
frequencies. 
Sources: EU-SILC 2008 (UDB); Hoffmann, 2012; OECD, 2013; IMD, 2013. 
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Table 2: Results (odds ratios) of one-step multilevel logistic regression models, 27 European 
countries, 2008, countries included as random intercepts (Model 1) and fixed effects (Model 2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Country = Random 
Intercept 
Country = Fixed Effect 
 HIA HAROI HIA HAROI 
 Odds ratios Odds ratios Odds ratios Odds ratios 
Household-level factors     
Major income dropa 
  Job loss 
 
2.740*** 
 
2.368*** 2.413*** 2.275*** 
  Change in hours worked/wages 2.407*** 2.382*** 2.084*** 2.435*** 
  Inability to work 3.205*** 3.636*** 2.850*** 3.530*** 
  Parental leave/child care 1.654*** 1.916*** 1.429*** 1.858*** 
  Retirement 1.210* 1.498** 0.999 1.835**  
  Marriage/relationship breakdown 1.855*** 2.196*** 1.807*** 2.247*** 
  Other change in household 
composition 
1.695*** 2.167*** 
1.714*** 2.104*** 
  Other reason 1.764*** 1.903*** 1.756*** 1.940*** 
Equivalent personal incomeb 
   5th decile 
 
0.500*** 
 
0.440*** 0.537*** 0.466*** 
   10th decile 0.220*** 0.0478*** 0.268*** 0.054*** 
HH has asset income 0.500*** 0.325*** 0.441*** 0.237*** 
Household typec (hx060)     
  2 adults < 65, no dependent child  0.932* 0.945 0.901* 0.916    
  2 adults, at least 1 > 65, no dep. child 0.791*** 0.838** 0.821*** 0.828*   
  Other households without dep. 
children  
1.090** 1.089 
1.034 1.016 
  Single parent, 1+ dependent children 1.815*** 1.933*** 1.607*** 1.747*** 
  2 adults, 1 dependent child 1.102** 1.094 1.044 0.991    
  2 adults, 2 dependent children 1.022 0.903 0.965 0.872    
  2 adults, 3+ dependent children 1.401*** 1.446*** 1.250*** 1.305*   
  Other household with dep. children 1.240*** 1.133* 1.136* 1.072 
  Other (excl. from Laeken indicators) 1.421** 1.618* 1.284 1.609 
Educational leveld     
  ISCED 2-3 of top-earner in hh 0.878*** 0.818*** 0.924 0.794*** 
  ISCED 4-6 of top-earner in hh 0.688*** 0.568*** 0.722*** 0.568*** 
Gender of top-earnere 1.124*** 1.281*** 1.106*** 1.274*** 
Age of top-earnerf 
  26-35 years 
 
0.963 
 
0.939 0.987 1.162 
  36-45 years 0.780*** 0.856* 0.788*** 0.994 
  46-55 years 0.714*** 0.942 0.699*** 1.052 
  56-65 years 0.511*** 0.834** 0.519*** 0.938 
  >65 years 0.303*** 0.443*** 0.322*** 0.498*** 
     
Countriesg     
Belgium   1.058 1.307 
Bulgaria   4.618*** 4.909*** 
Cyprus   1.204* 1.993*** 
Czech Republic   0.325*** 0.561*** 
Germany   1.253** 0.737 
Denmark   0.751* 0.598 
17 
 
Estonia   0.820* 0.370*** 
Spain   0.604*** 0.641**  
Finland   2.127*** 1.104 
Greece   2.905*** 2.281*** 
Hungary   1.041 1.346* 
Ireland   0.841 1.265 
Iceland   1.713*** 0.819 
Italy   1.729*** 1.834*** 
Lithuania   0.566*** 0.440*** 
Luxembourg   0.341*** 0.318*** 
Latvia   1.120 1.143 
Netherlands   0.728*** 0.623* 
Norway   1.532*** 1.301 
Poland   0.964 1.194 
Portugal   0.466*** 0.529*** 
Romania   2.654*** 1.917*** 
Sweden   0.759*** 0.423*** 
Slovenia   1.722*** 1.580** 
Slovak Republic   0.378*** 0.518*** 
United Kingdom   1.359** 0.683* 
_intercept 0.384*** 0.0934*** 0.385*** 0.105*** 
     
Random effects     
Est. (logged) st.dev. for random 
intercept 
0.6658292 0.664353   
ICC 0.1187531 0.1182893   
-2LogLikelihood -59391.325 -24379.311 -59304.64h -24308.886h 
R2 dicho/Pseudo R2 0.18 0.32 0.15h 0.18h 
N (households) 203653 201605 203625 201577 
Note: Calculations based on EU-SILC 2008 (UDB). Odds ratios displayed. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001. Sample size varies due to listwise deletion. Pseudo R2 dicho based on Snijders and Bosker (2004: 
225). Reference categories are: a no major drop in income, b 1st decile, c One-person household, d ISCED 
1-2 of top-earner in household, e male, f Age of top-earner: 16-25 years, g Austria. Standard errors for 
models with country dummies are calculated using the STATA svy command and the complex sampling 
variables for EU-SILC 2008 provided at "http://www.ua.ac.be/main.aspx?c=tim.goedeme&n=95420" 
(2013-02-11) by Goedemé (2013). 
h -2log likelihood and R2, however, are not available for this procedure and are thus taken from a model 
with cluster robust S.E but without weights. 
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Table 3: Results (odds ratios) of one-step multilevel logistic regression models, 27 European countries, 2008: effects of selected country-level variables on the 
dependent variables  
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
 
 
 
Economic 
literacy 
Debt discharge regimes 
(Ref.: no/very weak discharge regime) 
 
Net replacement 
rate 
Employment regimes  
(Ref.: post-socialist regime) 
Partial 
discharge 
Full 
discharge 
Most debtor 
friendly 
Liberal Corporatist Social-
democratic 
Mediterranean 
HIA          
  Odds ratios 0.957 0.431** 0.698 1.032 0.982** 0.978 0.802 0.963 0.976 
  N (households) 195.177 161.136 161.136 161.136 203.653 203.653 203.653 203.653 203.653 
HAROI          
  Odds ratios 0.823** 0.504*LR 0.466**LR 0.507LR 0.976*** 0.748 0.663 0.527* 1.093 
  N (households) 193.129 159.237 159.237 159.237 201.605 201.605 201.605 201.605 201.605 
Note: EU-SILC 2008 (UDB); Hoffmann, 2012; OECD, 2013; IMD World Competitiveness Yearbooks 2005-2008. Own calculations; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
LR LR-test was significant at p < 0.1. HIA: households in arrears; HAROI: households at risk of over-indebtedness. All models contain micro-level variables as in 
Table 2 (not displayed here). 
 
Table 4: Results (logodds) of two-step multilevel logistic regression models, 2008 (2nd step): effects of selected country-level variables on the country intercepts 
 Model 7 Model 8  Model 9 Model 10 
 
 
 
HIA 
 
Economic 
literacy 
Debt discharge regimes 
(Ref.: no/very weak discharge regime) 
 
Net replacement 
rate 
Employment regimes  
(Ref.: post-socialist regime) 
Partial 
discharge 
Full 
discharge 
Most debtor 
friendly 
Liberal Corporatist Social-
democratic 
Mediterranean 
  Logodds 0.0421 -0.1907 0.0819 0.1887 -0.0020 0.5233 0.2910 -0.0149 0.2427 
  N (countries) 25 20 20 20 27 27 27 27 27 
HAROI          
  Logodds -0.167 0.2356 -0.8485 -0.3489 -0.0274b 0.3376F 0.1998F -1.6569***F -0.1876F 
  N (countries) 25 20 20 20 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: EU-SILC 2008 (UDB); Hoffmann, 2012; OECD, 2013; IMD, 2013. Own calculations; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. F F-test was significant at p < 0.5. HIA: 
households in arrears; HAROI: households at risk of over-indebtedness. Models for step 1 (not displayed here) contain the same micro-level variables as in 
Table 2 and also account for complex sampling. 2-step estimations based on STATA edvreg.ado. b p-value for this parameter with robust S.E. is 0.14 and 0.08 
without robust S.E.  
19 
 
Figure 1: Association of intercepts and selected country-level variables by country or regime type: 
descriptive results  
 
  
Sources: EU-SILC 2008 (UDB); Hoffmann, 2012; OECD, 2013; IMD, 2013. 
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